Global Warming Denial: What Does it Take? A Case Study of Climate Change Denialists

Introduction

In the mid-1970s after the consensus dismissed the bullshit idea of "global cooling," serious concerns were raised about global climate change: its impact on the earth, and how we were (and still are) contributing to it. Vast research efforts were put into this issue, and now the international community is on board to combat the effects of global warming. The official consensus is now that global climate change is real, it's happening, and we're responsible for it.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) recently reported that this past October was the fifth month this year to reach record temperatures; and that unless we find some drastic decline in the temperature in November and December, 2014 will mark the hottest year on record. The effects will be catastrophic if global temperature means continue to increase as they have been. Some infectious diseases and parasitic insects will likely multiply at alarming rates from increasing heat, the sea levels will rise from the melting of the ice caps, and of course it will be very, very hot. The effects of global warming are numerous, and we're all ready to jump on board to help remove our carbon footprints and mitigate the effects of this dramatic rise on global temperatures. Or are we?

This blog has covered global warming denial in the past, and the results have been quite hilarious. Some denialists dispute the consensus over global warming, which has been addressed here. To summarize, there are numerous studies which all suggest that at least 90% of scientists agree that global warming is happening and that we're responsible for it. These studies all had different methodologies, but came to concordance on the conclusion. Denialists dispute the validity of these studies, but when the results have been replicated by multiple different methods, it's hard to argue that they're all wrong. Some also dispute based on the wording of the questions asked, suggesting that they're ambiguous and that even 'climate realists' would respond "yes" to most of the questions. This is, of course, a major semantics debate; and in the face of a semantics debate, it's helpful to apply Occam's razor and take the more parsimonious conclusion. The result is simple: the consensus on global climate change is solid.

Others will outright ignore the consensus and try to argue based on their knowledge, or what they've read online, that global warming isn't happening. Many of these arguments, as well, have been addressed on this blog. I won't go through a summary of those talking points, but I would highly recommend reading the linked post. Basically, scientific evidence is also not on the side of denialists (no surprise there).

Given the evidence, it's fairly obvious that denialists of Anthropogenic Climate Change (ACC) don't have a leg to stand on. Why, then, do they persist? What does it take to convince a denialist?

Extreme Weather

Many scientists up until now have believed that with enough droughts, floods, heat waves and other examples of extreme weather, climate change "skeptics" (quotes because I don't like this warm, fuzzy term being used for such persistent denialists) will come to terms with reality and start addressing it appropriately. This isn't without evidence [Hamilton & Keim, 2007; Egan & Mullan, 2012], and seems reasonable enough - both studies have displayed that there is a correlation between regional weather experiences and political orientation concerning global climate change. It makes sense that if someone is getting the worst of something, they are more likely to support a theory which addresses their concerns.

As recent research shows, however, this hypothesis is not very robust and has mixed support. Moreover, it is only one piece of the puzzle. The winter of 2012 was the fourth warmest winter on record going back to 1895; and yet when asked whether or not they attribute this to climate change, only 35% of respondents said yes [McCright et al., 2014]. Granted, the study does find that individual experiences with weather anomalies has a significant effect on perceived warming; however, it still shows that even direct consequences of global warming aren't enough to convince some people. How about that? Climate change denialists are Monty Python's Black Knights.

Political Party

Although intuitive, the study by McCright et al. clarifies that there is an association between political party identification and climate change denial. This is not the first time the lead study author has established said association [McCright et al., 2011], but it raises an important question of politicization of climate change and how it affects people's perceptions of the issue.

We should all be familiar with the efforts by Bush aides to quash research and publication thereof concerning climate change. This was a major strike for party politics in science - governmental influence can be non-transparent in some scenarios, and the officials we have in government may be influencing the publication of important scientific research. Publication bias is definitely not an unheard of phenomenon, but I believe most Americans like to think that "the system" is not so corrupt. Perhaps it is. Certainly McCright thinks so: his research and examination of conservative anti-reflexivity and its impact on climate science and policy speaks for itself [McCright & Dunlap, 2010].

Don't think that conservatives are exclusive in science denialism, however. While conservatives are more likely to take a stance against global warming, liberals are more traditionally associated with anti-GMO sentiments [Lewandowsky et al., 2013], although this connection is not too strong. I can support that conclusion, however. Regardless, it stands to be said that conservativism and free-market ideology serve as good predictors for rejection of science.

Denialism can come from within the scientific community as well. Naomi Oreskes, who is well known for her study which contributed to the establishment of public knowledge of a scientific consensus on climate change [Oreskes, 2004], wrote a book, one that I would highly recommend, with Erik Conway on the political underpinnings and implications of research on several key and contentious issues in historic scientific discourse entitled Merchants of Doubt. The authors draw attention to seven issues - acid rain, smoking, secondhand smoking, the ozone hole, global warming, the Strategic Defensive Initiative, and the banning of DDT - and clarifies the scientific consensus on all of them, as well as pinpointing which small groups of scientists have been largely responsible for the unfounded charges against the consensus, which science reporters and internet bloggers had uncritically repeated.

Internet

I and my coauthor share the concerns raised by Oreskes and Conway regarding science reporting and internet blogging of scientific research, which has become very weak and uncritical in recent years; though I can't argue from experience that it has ever been too strong. Needless to say, the internet may play an even more crucial role in the public's perception of climate change that one may think.

This gets into a research topic that is of personal interest to me. I've always been interested in the ideological implications of internet filter bubbles and how web pandering to people of specific interests serves to uphold the biases and preconceptions they may have on an issue. Not everyone is familiar with filter bubbles, so let me provide two examples of how a filter bubble works: both of which are very real.

Let's use the example of hypothetical person A (HPA) and hypothetical person B (HPB). HPA (who I have modeled after myself) is very fascinated with international politics and loves to look at the historical context which led up to certain key events in American history, such as 9/11. Perhaps he has read a few books on the issue, such as The Looming Tower by Lawrence Wright. When he looks up "9/11" on Google, then, his first results will most likely be the Wikipedia page and a few books and articles on the situation, or maybe recent news articles regarding the issue.

HPB (who I have modeled over an old administrator of mine) is a libertarian, possibly a conspiracy nut, and despises the American government. He likes to look for all the disgusting things America has done - some of them being true, such as the atrocities at Abu Ghraib or Guantanamo Bay. He's also interested in the evidence that the planes which crashed into the Twin Towers could not have caused the destruction they did, or at least in the same manner. There had to be bombs, and someone had to plant those bombs. Thus when he searches "9/11" on Google, his first result may be from Loose Change.

Let me give the other example: very recently, I wanted to look up my internet download/upload rate and see if it's comparable, or at least adequate, to modern standards. I typed into Google "is X mbps a good download rate," expecting a solid response from someone on a torrent website I've visited before. To my incredible surprise, the very first result was a thread in Stormfront. Why? Because I've also been involved in the debates over race that Lex has gotten herself into, and so despite absolutely clearing all of my search history and browser cookies/preferences, that was the result I got. When I used a web proxy, however, and searched the same thing, the Stormfront thread did not appear.

This is how filter bubbles can affect the results of your research, where you may think you're looking into something objectively, but in reality your search engine is pandering to your interests and giving you things it thinks you will like. While there is little research in this arena as far as I'm aware of, I think this is a very real cause of concern for scientific research and public engagement in the scientific discourse. The internet may be playing a dangerous role in inhibiting discussion and polarizing political and social players - or at least, a more dangerous role than we already know to be the case. While not covered heavily, I believe this can also explain part of the reason individuals persist in climate change denial, and many other types of pseudoscience, such as water fluoridation.

I gave a lot of attention to this section, but it's important to mention and make people aware of what they're potentially subjecting themselves to when they research things online. It's not very often you can extend topics of such specification beyond their initial scope like this.

Education

This is perhaps the biggest issue regarding climate change denial. One cornerstone paper in Nature displayed that conservatives who are more scientifically or mathematically literate are even less likely than their liberal counterparts to accept global warming [Kahan et al., 2011]. This suggests that education cannot, by itself, mitigate climate change denial when political polarization is an overwhelming variable in the mixture. That being said, new research does have some interesting statements to make, both about ideology and about education.

Since it seems to be the case that science literacy can intensify polarization, as shown by the Kahan study, a better case may be to examine adolescents, perceived as a more receptive audience. Testing the level of climate literacy in teenagers, it was found that individuals with more individualistic worldviews were 16.1% less likely than communitarians to accept global warming at initial stages [Stevenson et al., 2014]. At low levels of literacy, individualists were even less likely to accept global warming - 24.1% less likely than communitarians; however, at high levels of literacy, the gap essentially closes, and the effect of climate literacy and education has a much more positive effect on individualists than communitarians. These results seem to suggest that while polarization may be an overwhelming factor in adults, early intervention and science education for adolescents and younger, equally receptive audiences can mitigate climate change denial.

Of course, it seems intuitive that educating people would help, right? Then there are those who would call it "indoctrination," but...

Gender/Race

The "while male" effect describes how men tend to judge risks lower than women, and whites judge risks lower than blacks [Finucane et al., 2010]. I'm not too well read on this particular aspect and its contributions to climate change denial, but the evidence seems to suggest there is some association. The aforementioned study by Stevenson et al. did find a significant difference in global warming acceptance between males and females, whites and non-whites; non-whites and females were more likely to accept global warming than whites and males, thus invoking the "white male" effect. There is no solid explanation for these things - Finucane et al. suggests a complex interaction between the two factors. At an initial glance, I could say that one confounding variable would be (of course) political ideology, since non-whites and females are more likely to be liberal than whites and males. The answer, however, is not clear.

Conclusion

There are a multitude of reasons behind climate change denial and why it persists against the scientific consensus. Political party and the internet, in my opinion, play the biggest roles in the issue. As far as "what does it take," I think the most prospective mitigation effort would have to be science education at an early age. I recall very limited environmental science education from my early years in public primary school, and even more limited in parochial secondary school, and so am fortunate that I was not convinced at my younger ages that ACC was a hoax. I know others, however, who were not so fortunate.

There was a book I used to read a lot when I was very little, If You Give a Pig a Pancake. I think the action-consequences relationship between pigs and pancakes, and all of the related stories I read of the same syntax, describes the associations I reviewed in this article fairly well. I would have entitled this post If You Give a Denialist an Evidence, but the flow wouldn't have been good (not just because of the horrible grammar), and it also wouldn't have fit into the "Global Warming Denial" series, nor would it have revealed what I would be covering in the post itself. All my readers who got through this post in its entirety, however, may call it whatever they please.

Thank you all for reading, and I'll see you all next time!



Sources:

Egan, P., & Mullin, M. (2012). Turning Personal Experience into Political Attitudes: The Effect of Local Weather on Americans’ Perceptions about Global Warming. The Journal of Politics, 74 (03), 796-809 DOI: 10.1017/S0022381612000448

Finucane, M., Slovic, P., Mertz, C., Flynn, J., & Satterfield, T. (2000). Gender, race, and perceived risk: The 'white male' effect. Health, Risk & Society, 2 (2), 159-172 DOI: 10.1080/713670162

Hamilton, L., & Keim, B. (2009). Regional variation in perceptions about climate change. International Journal of Climatology, 29 (15), 2348-2352 DOI: 10.1002/joc.1930

Kahan, D., Peters, E., Wittlin, M., Slovic, P., Ouellette, L., Braman, D., & Mandel, G. (2012). The polarizing impact of science literacy and numeracy on perceived climate change risks. Nature Climate Change, 2 (10), 732-735 DOI: 10.1038/nclimate1547

Lewandowsky, S., Gignac, G., & Oberauer, K. (2013). The Role of Conspiracist Ideation and Worldviews in Predicting Rejection of Science. PLoS ONE, 8 (10) DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0075637

McCright, A., & Dunlap, R. (2010). Anti-reflexivity: The American Conservative Movement's Success in Undermining Climate Science and Policy. Theory, Culture & Society, 27 (2-3), 100-133 DOI: 10.1177/0263276409356001

McCright, A., & Dunlap, R. (2011). The Politicization of Climate Change And Polarization in The American Public's Views of Global Warming, 2001-2010. Sociological Quarterly, 52 (2), 155-194 DOI: 10.1111/j.1533-8525.2011.01198.x

McCright, A., Dunlap, R., & Xiao, C. (2014). The impacts of temperature anomalies and political orientation on perceived winter warming. Nature Climate Change, 4 (12), 1077-1081 DOI: 10.1038/nclimate2443

Oreskes, N. (2004). Beyond The Ivory Tower: The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change. Science, 306 (5702), 1686-1686 DOI: 10.1126/science.1103618

Stevenson, K., Peterson, M., Bondell, H., Moore, S., & Carrier, S. (2014). Overcoming skepticism with education: interacting influences of worldview and climate change knowledge on perceived climate change risk among adolescents. Climatic Change, 126 (3-4), 293-304 DOI: 10.1007/s10584-014-1228-7

Masculinity/Femininity And The "Return Of Kings" (ROK) Complex: An Anthropological Perspective

I know, I'm sorry, I'll get to some topics that people are asking for eventually. I have several in my queue that I want to get published some time soon, but the large majority of them are going to be covered by Nick who, as I'm sure many of you have noticed, is MIA. I promise to keep things interesting, though, until that time comes; that is, I'm going to try (at least in this post) to give the attitude he may have, had he done this himself.

This is actually on behalf of a new friend of mine who will go unnamed for personal reasons. He's unfamiliar with typical Western culture and is confused easily by the way we approach issues, topics and ideas in general. Not so recently, he dug through my search history (I know, right?) and found a website that I'm pretty sure is going to inadvertently mentally scar him. This website is none other than Return Of Kings.

I have more game than Roosh V.

Return Of Kings (ROK), in my own words, is a misogynistic website filled with misogynistic people who have fringe, uninformed ideas of the way society (and people) operate. I'm fairly certain most of the stories told on that website are made up, or at least exaggerated, but that's beside the point. Its central focus rests on the concepts of masculinity and femininity, which they use as universal terms which only have one meaning. It's run by a guy who goes by the moniker "Roosh V," who has been dubbed the internet's most infamous misogynist. When I say misogynist, I mean the traditional definition of the word (not the meaningless semantics that surround its modern use): woman-hater.

Nothing particularly new or interesting here, so let's get to the point: what did my friend see that confused him so much? Well, it was this:

"Return Of Kings is a blog for heterosexual, masculine men. It’s meant for a small but vocal collection of men in America today who believe men should be masculine and women should be feminine."

He didn't understand what it meant for men to be masculine or women to be feminine; that is, he didn't realize that men could be anything but masculine, or women to be anything but feminine. I knew instantly what he was confused about: the difference between "sex" and "gender" in our culture (and all others), and how those roles can sometimes not be coincident with one another. For those of you unfamiliar with what I'm talking about, it's easily summed up in this way: sex refers to the biological differences between males and females, while gender refers to the interpretations and expectations of them prescribed by society. What ROK means by "men should be masculine" or "women should be feminine" is that the sexes of humans should maintain their "traditional" gender roles, which have been prescribed to them by their biological predispositions (or so ROK says). This is an issue that has been addressed exhaustively by people from many disciplines, but most recognizably by feminists.

I should be honest here: I'm not a feminist. I think that the goals of feminism, as it was originally intended, have long been achieved. I believe that the prejudices and discriminatory institutions/practices which may disenfranchise underprivileged groups are contingent upon complex social structures which hardly anyone actually understands (if you even understood that sentence, you're on the right track), and thus the remaining facets of the social movement are just about politics and shouting (or "critical analysis," cue laugh track). These kinds of topics normally aren't a huge focus of mine, because I'm not interested in them; quite frankly, I agree with the rest of the world that ROK should continue to be ignored, and that their idiocy is recognized by the majority of sensible people. It should really end at that.

Paraphrase: "Men should be masculine." - Cher

Someone accused me on my last post of writing specifically to apply social constructionism and "cultural determinism" to these topics; so I've figured out a way to tie this into my anthropological/psychological interests, namely by just examining their About page. Not only do I get the satisfaction of knowing that they're idiots, but I also get the joy of being able to incorporate an otherwise uninteresting topic (for me, personally) into something unique and cool. I don't think anyone else has taken the approach I'm about to take, and so this should be pretty exciting for some of you. For the rest of you, well... try anyway.

So here's what I actually figured out: the About page is, no duh, a representation of the premises the website is founded on. Rebut their premises, and you have dismissed their conclusions and insulted their ideas of masculinity and being douchebags. I don't feel like just saying that they're dumb -- I feel like explaining why they're dumb, rationally, so that other people can recognize their idiocy as well without sharing the kind of innate reactions I have to individuals/groups with behaviour similar to that of ROK. I'm going to do a point-by-point refutation of the seven premises that ROK is founded upon, and hopefully make a few people angry. Most importantly for me, however, I'm going to explain to my friend (who will, hopefully, read this post in its entirety) why none of what ROK says makes any sense given the knowledge we have, and why he may have been confused in the first place.

With that, let's begin.

1. Men and women are genetically different, both physically and mentally. Sex roles evolved in all mammals. Humans are not exempt.

This is not wrong at its face: the sexes naturally have their own physical/mental differences due to the fact that, as the nature of being male or female demands, they differ genetically. The error is in omission, or at the very least implication. Presumably, what they mean is that the sex roles found in humans (I will warn now that this is dependent on cultural context) are a result of genetic differences, and the physical/mental differences in males and females are genetic in origin. This is not the case. We hardly understand the nature of sex differences in many areas (as my last post shows), and so don't understand the origin of those differences, whether they be environmental, genetic, or a complex combination of the two. What's even more interesting is their admission that sex roles evolve in mammals. In fact they do, but these roles are not consistent with each other, and we often find "role reversal" among many species of mammals that is counter intuitive to what most people think, as many people believe that sex roles are the result of just having a sex chromosome.

Nobody denies sexual dimorphism.

Usually, one replies to these arguments by arguing Bateman's principle, which has generally been accepted as being true. It's important to note that Bateman's original experiment was flawed methodologically, although his conclusion appears to be true for most mammals, and the traditional argument that when sex roles are reversed in a species, so are other factors like reproductive success (RS) variance is not always the case. But is it true for humans? Not entirely sure, as reliable information is limited and human populations are quite diverse; however, analysis of what data is available brings some questions to Bateman's principles as applied to humans. This study has been batted around as both supporting and opposing Bateman's conclusions, but such debates should be suspect to scrutiny due to the fact that there were only 18 populations examined in the study. At present, as stated, we're not sure what the nature is of many complexities in the human species in terms of sex/gender differences. It is vital to remember, though, that the extent that culture plays a role in our species is unprecedented in any other species of mammal, and so the consequences are very possibly not what we'd expect.

2. Men will opt out of monogamy and reproduction if there are no incentives to engage in them.

This is a peculiar claim. I'd venture to guess that the reason they included "if there are no incentives to engage in them" is that the people at ROK see monogamous marriage (i.e. to them, dedication to a woman) as a sign of weakness or inferiority in men, and so if they find themselves in this position, they can say "I had a logical reason to do this for my own benefit."

The reason it's peculiar, however, is that it's at odds with reality. While the majority of societies in the world do practice polygamy (about 83% of sampled societies), most people practice monogamy due to increasing industrialization and the fact that industrialized cultures have greater populations than pre-industrialized cultures. What I find funny about the argument, however, is that if we're speaking in terms of RS variance or just evolution, what incentive could be greater than having more children? Then I get confused, because it says they'll opt out of reproduction as well, which is antithetical to Bateman's principles and, well, evolution, which is (according to them) the cause of the differences between men and women that they so desperately want to preserve and declare. Maybe this is bad writing on the owner's part, but I think it's more likely that this is a result of stupidity.

Getting back to the argument, it could be countered that the "incentive" (or rather, the pressure) for more people to practice monogamy is industrialization; that is, to keep up with the status quo, men are practicing monogamy at "unnatural" levels. But societies change -- if we go back far enough, all of our ancestors were hunter-gatherers (H/G). These changes don't just occur as preemptive self-pressures from the future status quo, but as responses to many different pressures as a result of cultural adaptation, a unique phenomenon mostly exclusive to humans. It could be argued that this is "bad," but to what standard do we hold this to be true? Because it's assumed to be biological? This is an appeal to nature, as what's "natural" isn't always the best, and what's biological isn't necessarily the prevailing pressure on how we behave and think.

What's even more interesting about this is that our origins aren't even polygamous. Many H/G cultures did and do exhibit monogamy. This is because marriage systems only make sense in the context of culture, not as part of some evolutionary preference in our species.

3. Past traditions and rituals that evolved alongside humanity served a net benefit to the family unit.

Of course, but this is a universal statement for a multifaceted phenomenon. The structure of a family unit changes from culture to culture, from consanguineous to nuclear to polygamous to extended families dominating whatever given society, and so "traditions and rituals" (as vague as that is, but I'll go with it) "evolved" alongside human cultures in a way that these complex social systems make sense when combined together. Here, it's assumed that "traditions and rituals" holds no ambiguity and makes sense even when not given a particular time or space in which those traditions and rituals were found, but this is consistent with the assumed universality of all of the claims made on ROK as the basis for their beliefs. This one isn't too interesting, so let's move on.

4. Testosterone is the biological cause for masculinity. Environmental changes that reduce the hormone’s concentration in men will cause them to be weaker and more feminine.

Here we get into the definition of masculinity. I can't make any assumptions based just on what I see here, but what I can say for sure is that "masculinity" changes, again, from culture to culture and has no set definition. Presumably what they mean is that their definition of "masculine" is the right one, and so that is the basis for their claims. Circulating testosterone levels are higher in males than in females and do result in the enhancement of sex traits, and to this extent I might agree with this premise. The difficulty to be found here, however, is the burning question: what is masculinity?

Notice how most of these effects are non-behavioural.

Testosterone can be linked to a suite of traits, including muscle growth and efficiency, alcoholism and aggression (although the evidence for the latter is up for scrutiny); yet I wouldn't start calling a man less "masculine" for not being an alcoholic or being able to control his temper. This is because masculinity is up for interpretation, and testosterone is not the only thing which influences this trait. For example, one might consider it gay for men to be hugging and kissing in a bar, yet this is quite common in Spain and Italy after a celebration or a winning football game. It might be considered feminine for men to be shy and timid, avoiding direct eye contact in America, but this is the norm in Japan. Gender roles are culturally constructed, and so to say that hormones cause men to be "masculine" is only one perspective. It would be more accurate to say "testosterone is important in the expression of sex traits in males and females, and some attributes of those traits, such as increased muscle or more hair, are considered 'masculine' in American society." There are no universal claims to be made here, however.

5. A woman’s value significantly depends on her fertility and beauty. A man’s value significantly depends on his resources, intellect, and character.

This seems contradictory to the "men will opt out of reproduction" claim, unless of course "beauty" is the incentive to marry and reproduce... but then what is beauty? There are different standards of beauty around the world, again: probably the most well known example of this is the 'peculiar' tradition of women of the Kayan tribe in Thailand to add gold rings to their neck when they're young and keep adding to stretch out their necks. Another example might be self-scarring in the Karo tribe of Ethiopia, which is seen as a beautiful trait for women. This same habit of self-scarring is seen among the Nuer of southern Sudan, only it is also seen as a sign of maturity and masculinity among the men (the boys receive gaar on their foreheads to enter manhood, while the women have their skin plucked to create bumps on their skin).

So we see that beauty has different definitions; but whatever the case may be, is it true that fertility and beauty are what women are valued for universally? This is not so. Women in many horticultural societies with bride-wealth systems of marriage exchange are seen as valuable purely for the fact that once they are married off, they receive wealth from the groom, and this wealth is shared with their brothers so that they are able to marry. A woman's value in these cultures, then, is dependent on their ability to get their brothers married as well. A woman's wealth is her value in systems where the marriage exchange is through a dowry, as (although this is unintended) her wealth is then transferred to the husband's possession (unless the woman is smart enough to bury it, or something).

So, a woman's beauty is subjective, her fertility should be irrelevant according to ROK, and neither of these are necessary/sufficient conditions for her to be seen as valuable. What of men? Is their value dependent on their resources, intellect and character?

"Beauty" to the Nuer.

Notice how these three traits enable the man much more leniency than the woman. ROK sets strict standards for beauty and denounces many things which may be seen as beautiful to other people from other cultures or backgrounds, such as piercings or tattoos. Their fertility is not up for interpretation. A man's character, intellect and resources, however, are all up for interpretation, with the former probably having the strictest conditions of the three. What makes a man intelligent? I doubt they ask for a man's IQ upon meeting him, or expect women to do so. I also doubt that their only condition for intellect is "think like us" (though this wouldn't surprise me). What is "character," too? Confidence? Is that it? Who knows? I certainly don't, but I can say quite easily that a man's value can be dependent on other things as well.

Consider the Nuer again. A man's value in their culture is the beauty, strength and health of his cattle, which he worships as being his connection to God. Could this be considered a resource? Perhaps, but you could say then that everything is a resource: beauty is a resource if used correctly, as are power tools. Resource is a vague term, and so if this is the standard of value for men, men have a lot of leeway; and coming from ROK, it's not hard to see why this may be the case.

6. Elimination of traditional sex roles and the promotion of unlimited mating choice in women unleashes their promiscuity and other negative behaviors that block family formation.

We've already discussed how the family unit is also a cultural construct, but what of this claim that if "traditional sex roles" are eliminated, and unlimited mating choice is promoted, that women will become promiscuous? This is also not so, but this is by their own admission. As we've seen, a woman's value is dependent on her beauty and her fertility. If, then, a woman is "ugly" and infertile, she can try to be as promiscuous as she wants and violate all the traditional sex roles that they want her to have; her desires will not come to fruition, and "true men" will shun her as being low in worth and not appropriate for marriage. Also, what family formation do they see as being desirable? Presumably not one contingent on monogamy, but then what is their standard for the family unit? Polygamous marriage and subsequent creation of an "odd" family unit in America, for example, would be antithetical to personal liberties and individualization which marks industrialized societies.

Let's get past that, though. Do women become promiscuous if sex roles are destroyed and unlimited mating choices are granted to them? Apparently not, as the fertility rate (according to them) drops when these things occur, as we will see in their final premise. In addition, as one of the articles reveal, they find this perfectly acceptable and go out of their way to benefit from such behaviour.

So their arguments are contradictory, we get that, but I know that someone is going to say "contraception!" So, assuming contraception is available to all women, and they meet the qualifications again, does their promiscuity increase? Again, it is not so. If this were the case, we should expect that women who are more promiscuous would use more contraceptives to counter their behaviour, but this isn't the case. Women who use contraceptives are no more likely to engage in promiscuous behaviour than their counterparts. At every facet of this argument, it falls apart. Now, for the final point.

7. Socialism, feminism, cultural Marxism, and social justice warriorism aim to destroy the family unit, decrease the fertility rate, and impoverish the state through large welfare entitlements.

I wanted to make a post about this in the past, but since it has come up here, I'll just state the facts. First off, the concept of "cultural Marxism" is a joke. Secondly, there's no connection between socialism and fertility (otherwise the United States TFR would be skyrocketing, and Sweden's TFR would be plummeting, but they're comparable). There's also no connection between feminism and fertility (otherwise Japan's TFR would be skyrocketing, and America's TFR would be plummeting, but America's TFR is higher than Japan's). We've already gone over the family unit, and socialist nations are by far not the most impoverished states in the world. Fertility rates are dropping because of economic downfall, higher rates of education, government policy actions (i.e. China, India), etc. This is not too interesting to talk about since the data is out there and readily available. It's just wrong.

Fertility rate by country. No signs of socialist interference here.

We're finally done. For those of you who kept up with all of this, good job. Now it's time to talk about the Return Of Kings Complex. As we've observed ROK seems to set standards that are much more lenient on men than on women, and do so without any backing. They are also contradictory in their stances, and so will say that one thing (feminism) causes fertility rates to fall, but will also cause promiscuity to rise. We know this to not be the case. Another example was that they claim promiscuous behaviour is bad and destroys the family unit, and yet they indulge in it.

So what are their motivations? Why is it that they make so many contradictory claims, and are so strong about how they think men and women should behave, when they have little-to-no support for their views? Let's consider a combination of things they believe:

1: Women will be promiscuous if given certain pressures, and this is bad; however, they're okay with it.
2: Men will not engage in monogamy unless given incentive to, yet the family unit (presumably the nuclear one) needs to be preserved.
3: Feminism is causing the destruction of the family unit and the fertility rate.
4: Women are only valuable because of their fertility and beauty, nothing else.

What can be inferred from each of these beliefs?

1: Women shouldn't be promiscuous, but men should be promiscuous and thus it's okay to be promiscuous with women who are promiscuous, so long as they're beautiful.
2: Men will naturally want more than one wife, but the family unit is being destroyed by women.
3: Empowering women and bringing them up in society causes the destruction of fertility rates and the family unit.
4: Women are not valued for anything besides how useful and appealing they are to men.

The motivation? No shit, they just really don't like women (but love them) and really love men (but they're not gay) and want men to be in charge (they like it like that). The conclusion?

The folks over at ROK are bisexual misanthropes who like to take it doggy style. This is the ROK Complex.

Thank you all very much for reading.



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Fluoridation, or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Water

General Jack D. Ripper with Captain Lionel Mandrake.

Most of us have heard the famous line by General Jack D. Ripper in Dr. Strangelove, "have you ever seen a Commie drink a glass of water?" The conversation thereafter satirically illustrated a fear that grew most prominent starting in the 1940s with the Second Red Scare -- public water fluoridation. Many conspiracy theories about water fluoridation arose during this time, but they all aimed to make the same case: that fluoride in drinking water is bad (sometimes just meaning unethical), and unhealthy, for various reasons that are being neglected by the government.

In a study published in JAMA by Oliver & Wood (2014) entitled "Medical Conspiracy Theories and Health Behaviors in the United States," it was found 49% of Americans believe in at least one of 6 medical conspiracy theories, including but not limited to concerns about "Agenda 21," the vaccine-autism link, and water fluoridation. For the latter, it was found that 12% of Americans believe that "public water fluoridation is really just a secret way for chemical companies to dump the dangerous byproducts of phosphate mines into the environment." This is just one of the many explanations for water fluoridation that conspiracy theorists provide, so the variation in the "theory" aspect of it is similar to that of "chemtrails;" but unlike the chemtrail conspiracy theories which are fairly recent (starting around the 1990s), water fluoridation has invoked fear from the public for quite some time, and remains a pervasive element of the disconnect between the scientific community relating to public health and the public itself. Nick has informed me already of two scenarios this semester where his classmates have promoted the concept. So with all the concern it raises, is the fear of public water fluoridation a legitimate concern?

Of course, it's unfair to group the concerns mentioned above with the Red Scare sentiments expressed in Dr. Strangelove, but the resentment against water fluoridation still fails to be substantive. The arguments of ethics not withstanding, water fluoridation is (if at all) not anywhere near as medically harmful as 12% of the American population believes it is. Here, we're going to examine some common arguments made by proponents of this conspiracy theory and refute them. Let's get started.

Fluoride is the only chemical added to water for the purpose of medical treatment.

It depends on how you define "medical treatment." One could argue that many processes conducted during water purification, such as disinfection to kill parasites and bacteria, can be considered medical treatment (specifically preventative treatment), but either way, this is actually a red herring. Whether or not it's the only chemical added to water is immaterial, because it doesn't lend any credibility to one side or the other; however, we can examine why it was added as "medical treatment," and start to make an informed decision.

Water fluoridation in the United States began in 1945 because a wave of dental hygienists began promoting the widespread distribution of fluoride to promote dental hygiene in the United States for individuals of all ages and income levels. It was meant to be a cost-effective, efficient way to distribute this treatment throughout the United States, and so it was. Approximately $40 billion have been saved in reduced oral health care expenditures in the United States over the past 40 years due to public water fluoridation.

To celebrate the coming of a new century, in 1999, the CDC released a statement about the top ten greatest public health achievements in America from 1900 - 1999. In this list, water fluoridation was listed. The report estimates that in 1999, fluoridated drinking water reached approximately 144 million people in the United States, effectively serving its purpose. The report also refers to the 1999 edition of a book by Burt and Eklund entitled Dentistry, Dental Practice, And the Community. In Chapter 25 of the book, the causes, effects and cost of water fluoridation in the United States are discussed. It estimates that there has been approximately a 40-70% decrease in child tooth decay and approximately a 40-60% decrease in adult tooth loss.

So not only were the intentions clear, but the results were evidential, and the effort was a success. The addition of fluoride to drinking water (in the United States anyway) was a medical treatment, but it was a justified one.

Dental health products, such as toothpaste and mouth wash, which contain fluoride, tell you not to swallow them.

This is due to the very high concentration of fluoride in them, which they acknowledge can make you sick. The fluoride in toothpaste and mouth wash, also, is meant for prolonged exposure to the teeth, for optimal usage.

The dose cannot be controlled.

This argument relies on two premises: (1) that without control, there is a risk for people to harm themselves from fluoridated water; and, (2) that a lack of individual dosage control is an argument against water fluoridation. For premise one, the toxic level of fluoride is around 5-10 grams for a typical 150 pound or 70 kilogram adult, using estimates provided in Clinical Toxicology of Commercial Products, a book produced by Gosselin, Smith and Hodge in 1984. The recommended number of glasses of water to drink is 8, so if there is 1 part fluoride for every million parts water, in 8 glasses of water, there is about 0.002 grams of fluoride -- this is about 1 tenth of a grain of sand. So, the toxic amount of fluoride (5-10 grams for a 70 kilogram adult) is 2500-5000 times greater than what is found in 8 glasses of water (0.002 grams of fluoride). That means that, with the strictest estimates, if all fluoride content received in water were to be retained in the body (it's not), it would take almost 7 years to reach the toxic level.

It should be noted, then, that 1 ppm was the optimal fluoridation amount at the beginning of the project, but is now around 0.7 ppm, and thus the amount of fluoride an individual receives is about 30% less than what we estimated above. The point being, however, is that the current levels of fluoride in drinking water are not enough to be of concern to people who drink a lot of it.

But going beyond premise one and onto premise two, the argument is again irrelevant. There are many chemicals introduced to public drinking water that, if ingested in excessive quantities, could pose health risks. This doesn't mean, however, that these chemicals should automatically be taken out, because this is the case for many different things we ingest, like tuna, apples or coffee. The issue is not in whether or not they could threaten their health by drinking too much, it's a question of if they will. This requires individual responsibility to an extent; however, given what we know from the content above, we can say that there isn't too much reason to start tallying your water intake and calculating the amount of fluoride you consumed therein.

The fluoride goes to everyone regardless of age, health or vulnerability.

This part of the article talks about the progression in pharmacotherapy from stereotyped medication to individualized therapy. What the quote cited failed to note is that individualized therapy is applied when there is reason to believe that patients can be divided into medically relevant subgroups that respond differently to specific treatment, and thus they need to examine an individual's characteristics (gender, age, ancestry, etc.) to make a determination of what treatment to use. What he also failed to mention is that, aside from individualized treatment, there is also evidence-based medicine (EBM), which essentially means the treatment of individuals based on the current best evidence available. Considering that water fluoridation only began after it was found in Grand Falls, Michigan that fluoride levels of 1.0 ppm in the water were optimal for preventing tooth decay, water fluoridation would be considered a public health initiative based in EBM.

Fluoride is used as a chemical in rat poison.

This is like arguing that because chlorine is used to chemically decontaminate pool water (but is toxic), and chlorine is also used in common table salt (a.k.a. sodium chloride), then chlorination of table salt should end. Chemicals used in one way do not have the same effects as chemicals used in another way.

No health agency in fluoridated countries is monitoring fluoride exposure or side effects.

Water fluoridation, in the United States, is monitored at the state level, and not by federal agencies. This should be considered a good thing, because different states have different cities and different states have different levels of naturally occurring fluoride in the water -- if this amount is too much, some is actually removed from the water supply. Aside from this, the claim that no health agency in any fluoridated countries monitors this is just unfounded. For example, here's England's 2014 report on fluoridation.

At this point, we should be able to acknowledge that water fluoridation is not a particularly harmful practice. I'm not denying here that there are some arguments to be made against water fluoridation as a governmental practice, but we can see that as a medical effort, it's not bad. For further information, I recommend reading the World Health Organization (WHO) report on water fluoridation across the world.

Thank you all very much for reading.



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References:  

Oliver, J., & Wood, T. (2014). Medical Conspiracy Theories and Health Behaviors in the United States. JAMA Internal Medicine, 174 (5) DOI: 10.1001/jamainternmed.2014.190

Evolution: Common Misconceptions, or "What Evolution Is Not"

I've recently been reading a book by Agustín Fuentes, Race, Monogamy, and Other Lies They Told You: Busting Myths about Human Nature with my girlfriend. We're only through part 1 (and the prelude of part 2), but it's an incredible read thus far, and I highly recommend it to anyone who is serious about their research in anthropology, evolution or human variation. Dr. Fuentes lays out a "toolkit," in his own words, on how to bust myths about human nature by applying the principles of genetics and culture to three common pervasive myths found in our society: (1) human race; (2) inherent human aggression; and, (3) sex.

Chapters 2 and 3 struck me well, but chapter 3 "Evolution Is Important -- but May Not Be What We Think," was especially informative and helpful. Dr. Fuentes starts off with a quote by popular science writer Nicholas Wade, who has recently come under fire for his book A Troublesome Inheritance: Genes, Race and Human History. The quote is from an article in the New York Times, and it says the following:

"Many have assumed that humans ceased to evolve in the distant past, perhaps when people first learned to protect themselves against cold, famine and other harsh agents of natural selection. But in the last few years, biologists peering into the human genome sequences now available from around the world have found increasing evidence of natural selection at work in the last few thousand years, leading many to assume that human evolution is still in progress."

The quote reflects on two popular misconceptions held by the public about evolution, which we will get to in a moment. It's important to note first, though, that this illustrates more than just misconceptions about evolution, but a lack of understanding in even the educated public, and the necessity of a false dichotomy. As Dr. Fuentes points out, "To sell the story, the false representation of a 'debate' as to whether evolution happens in humans has to be a central theme."

Of course, many people in the public hold the beliefs that Wade is referring to; however it simply isn't true that the primary debate amongst informed scholars is over whether or not evolution is happening in humans or, as some people often misinterpret, that evolution "stopped at the neck" in humans.

This objection refers to the debate over the Black/White IQ differential, specifically the position that most, if not all of the variation in IQ results between these two groups is a result of the environment. The problem with the characterization "evolution stopped at the neck," however, is that just because someone doesn't believe the differential is a result of evolutionary or genetic differences, that doesn't mean they don't believe human cognition has evolved. Evolution is complex, and even someone who suggests that the differential is a result of evolution doesn't necessarily mean it was a product of adaptation or natural selection. This is a gross oversimplification of how evolution works, and what the real debate entails, and thus we should now move into the five common misconceptions about evolution that are popularly held by the public.

1: Evolution is "survival of the fittest."

I can't tell you how many times I've heard this implication. To begin, Charles Darwin never used the phrase "survival of the fittest" -- this concept otherwise known as "social Darwinism" is attributable to Thomas Hobbes and Adam Smith. The concept is an interpretation of one aspect of evolution: natural selection. Natural selection is Darwin's process of "descent with modification," and states that some gene variants will help an organism reproduce more successfully, and that if these variants are heritable, they will become more common within a population over time. These variants are then seen as adaptations to a specific environmental context.

What this means is that "the fittest" doesn't necessarily mean the biggest, baddest or strongest. It's specific to an environment, where "the fittest" may be the exact opposite. Consider an easy example: the field mouse. It is not the fastest creature in the world, it is not the strongest, it does not have a serious bite, and it poses pretty much no risk to any creature of any size bigger than itself. So why does it continue to succeed and reproduce? Because "bigger" does not mean "better." Speaking of better, this brings us to the second misconception about evolution.

2: Evolution results in perfection.

As Fuentes notes, evolution is not oriented towards progress, nor does it result in organisms fitting perfectly with their environment. To quote, "The corollary to this is that if something works well we perceive it as having 'evolved' for this particular purpose."

Evolution is not perfect -- it's sloppy, and isn't geared towards making something ultimately "better." When an organism has traits which allow it to successfully reproduce in its environment, and these traits are a result of evolution, it does not mean that it evolved that way for a purpose.

3: Evolution happens by chance.

There is only one aspect of evolution that represents "chance," and that would be genetic drift. Genetic drift suggests that random events can sometimes alter the allelic frequencies of a population. Fuentes offers an example of this: take hair color. There is a small population living on an island with hair color gene A, and there are three alleles of the gene: A1, A2 and A3. Say the population is made up of 80% A1, 10% A2 and 10% A3. Now, imagine that most of the population lives on the north coast of the island, and that part of the island is hit by a major tsunami. Now, the only people remaining are the smaller numbers of people on the south end of the island, changing the allelic frequency to maybe 33% for all alleles of the hair color gene A. This results in evolutionary change, but not because of anything having to do with the genes or the alleles themselves, but with a random event which drastically changed the makeup of the organisms in the population. Genetic drift, then, is most potent in smaller populations, because random events are less likely to have significant effects on larger populations.

But as said, this is the only aspect of evolution that relies on randomness or chance. There are three other major components of evolution: gene flow, natural selection and mutation. We've already explained natural selection. Mutation is the means by which organisms gain new genetic material, where it creates a new sequence in a gene that produces a protein or regulation that functions better than previously. Gene flow is the movement of alleles within and between populations as a result of migration. The allelic frequencies within and between two populations can change if the populations are close enough together that allows for migrations between them. The allelic frequencies between the two populations can either become more similar if there's enough gene flow or, if gene flow is restricted, they can remain the same. Gene flow, natural selection, and mutation, then, do not occur by chance, but have multiple reasons for occurring.

4: If something has evolved in a certain way, that is how it should be.

This one is a bit complicated, but it's similar to misconception #2. Basically the idea is that if an organism exhibits a certain trait, and that trait is a result of evolutionary change, then the exhibition of that trait is the way things are supposed to be. This is not necessarily true, because there are many things that have occurred via evolutionary means, but were intended for a different purpose than what they're used for today. This is called exaptation.

One beautiful example of this is bird feathers. Originally, bird feathers evolved as a structure of temperature regulation. The feathers on a bird's wings allowed it to trap air underneath, allowing it to either cool off by lifting its wings up, or warm up by bringing its wings in. At some point, the wings on some birds became substantial enough that they were able to glide, and this unintended function resulted in reproductive success. Now, wings are used for flying. This is a perfect example of something that occurred through evolutionary processes, but did not serve the function it does now, thus showing that even if something has evolved does not mean it was intended to be what it is today.

5: Evolution can stop, has an end, or has a goal.

This is our last misconception. Evolution does not stop; it is always ongoing. Evolution is also not goal-oriented -- it doesn't have a goal, and it doesn't seek perfection. Something that has occurred by evolutionary means is not the finish line, and it is not more "natural" than other things. Traits that have evolved are the result of any number of processes that can and will continue to act on us and every other organism over the course of time.

These misconceptions overlap in many ways, but are very applicable to modern times. It's commonly held that if something has evolved, or if something is engrained in our biology, then that is "correct" or "natural." This is the basic premise of human nature which Dr. Fuentes argues against. Just because something is biological or evolutionary does not mean it is any more natural than any other aspect of our lives. The premise of this idea is that, for example, between our biology and our society, biology takes precedence as we cannot avoid its grasp, and our society or social situation can change. This simply isn't the case, though: our biology is constantly changing, and the strength of our genes is not more powerful than the strength of our environment.

Creationists, determinists, indeterminists, racialists, and many other groups of people will commonly fall into the belief in one of these misconceptions as part of their arguments. Be equipped and well-informed of what evolution is and is not so that these misconceptions can be further dispensed, and the core of the arguments can be reached instead of the nuances of what evolution does or does not imply.

And above all, thank you very much for reading.



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Brian Hooker's Hooked Hoax: Measles-Mumps-Rubella (MMR) Vaccination and Autism Spectrum Disorder

I always get the best stuff from Google+ to look at, don't I? This post is stemming from my last post on autism spectrum disorder (ASD), which was a response to a prompt by C0nc0rdance on YouTube. If you're interested in this topic, I would recommend reading it just to be familiarized with some of the literature, and then read the post-publish discussion in the comments section and on Google+. It's not necessary for this post, however.

Uh-oh.

In February of 2004, DeStefano et al. published a study entitled Age at first measles-mumps-rubella vaccination in children with autism and school-matched control subjects: a population-based study in metropolitan atlanta. This was a case-control study collected in Atlanta, comparing age of first MMR vaccination between children with autism (N=624) and the control children (N=1824), collecting data on maternal and birth factors from immunization forms and birth certificates, in order to determine risk of ASD at different age cutoffs of MMR immunization. The findings were that with the exception of vaccination before 36 months being more common in case children than control children (which was attributed to immunization requirements in early intervention programs, and was a modest 2.8% difference), there was no significant association between the age cutoffs and the risk of autism. This is one of many pieces of evidence which show that the MMR vaccine does not confer an increased risk in ASD.

However, 10 years after the initial study was conducted, famous anti-vaccine alarmist Brian Hooker, along with Andrew Wakefield, are talking about a "whistleblower" in the CDC claiming that the original data was fraudulent, and was masking a 336% increased risk in ASD in African American boys receiving the MMR vaccine "on time." Hooker published his own findings in the Journal of Translational Neurodegeneration, titling it Measles-mumps-rubella vaccination timing and autism among young african american boys: a reanalysis of CDC data. He claims that according to the "whistleblower," Dr. William Thompson, the CDC intentionally manipulated the data to bury this increased risk.

Here we go again.

To people who are familiar with the anti-vaccine movement, Hooker and Wakefield are household names. Wakefield has become famous for his scientific fraudulence, and Hooker has recently become the new big name, most likely taking pointers from Wakefield himself; thus making Dr. Hooker's name very apt.

But what exactly is going on here? Was the CDC fraudulent? Did they intentionally manipulate the data to hide this increased risk? Before we get to that, there are a few things we need to make note of.

It's always good to remain skeptical when someone proposes that they have reanalyzed already published data. In my experiences, although limited, this never amounts to anything good, and the arguments are usually pretty weak. On that same note, when someone reanalyzes data, they most likely have a chip on their shoulder. Keep in mind this isn't true for all reanalyses -- in fact, such reanalysis is what called Wakefield out for his fraudulence in the first place -- but I'm speaking from personal experience.

These a priori contentions not withstanding, Hooker's reanalysis just didn't seem right at all when I first looked at it. Let's just quote the conclusions from the abstract for a moment:

"The present study provides new epidemiologic evidence showing that African American males receiving the MMR vaccine prior to 24 months of age or 36 months of age are more likely to receive an autism diagnosis."

And from the results:

"Relative risks for males in general and African American males were 1.69 (p=0.0138) and 3.36 (p=0.0019), respectively."

Hooker went through all this trouble just to show that only African American males are at a higher risk for ASD from the MMR jab? That's certainly not going to do anything for Jenny McCarthy. Color me unimpressed by the so called coverup by the CDC, because it leaves the overwhelming majority of evidence that shows there is no link between the MMR vaccine and ASD untouched. In fact, even if he'd shown the whole study was fraudulent from its conception, he still would've left the overwhelming majority of research to the contrary untouched. Even better, a 3.36 increase in ASD isn't 336%. It's 236%.

Booker accuses DeStefano et al. (2004) of intentionally leaving out African American males in their sample in order to manipulate the results, but that's just not what happened. Subjects that were inappropriate, given age requirements and necessity of medical information, were excluded from the study because they wouldn't be able to control for the important things mentioned earlier: maternal and birth factors, as well as actually comparing something useful in this particular study. DeStefano et al. weren't manipulating the data, they were legitimizing it.

But the burning question here is: did Hooker even manage to show what he claimed he did? Are African American males at a higher risk for ASD from the MMR jab at ages younger than 24 or 36 months? Let's take a look inside the paper to find out.

"The relationship between the MMR vaccine and autism was first hypothesized by Wakefield et al. [7] in 1999 after the observation of a regressive phenotype of autism that appeared in general after the administration of the first MMR vaccine. Although several studies have affirmed such a relationship between the MMR vaccine and neurodevelopmental disorders including autism [8,9], many other studies purport no statistical relationship between the MMR vaccine and autism incidence."

This is only the third paragraph in, mind you, and Hooker cites Wakefield, and then two studies by the Geier duo. Don't make me laugh. Hooker is partaking in a classic "teach the controversy" grasp at straws to make it seem like there's even some doubt that the MMR vaccine isn't linked to ASD. No matter. Let's just skip to the methodology:

"Cohort data were obtained directly as a “restricted access data set” from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) via a Data Use Agreement. Data were deidentified by the CDC in accordance with Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) prior to receipt by the study authors."

Wait what? Cohort data? But the original study by DeStefano et al. was case-control. Oh, there we see it.

I know I have some readers who aren't too fond of statistical babble, so I'll sum up what the issue is here. The original study by DeStefano et al. used something called a case-control model. In a case-control model, you compare a group of case subjects (subjects with the disease) and control subjects (without the disease) and determine how frequently another variable occurs for either group of subjects while controlling for confounders and effect modifiers. Hooker, on the other hand, used a cohort model, which doesn't quite do the same thing. Regardless, using data that was arranged to be analyzed in a case-control model and then analyzing it in a cohort model is just screaming problems; especially when you chop up the data into multiple subcohorts so that any small effect will be magnified.

The funny thing is, even with the skewed methodology, the results aren't even impressive. Table 2 below from Hooker's paper shows the age group cutoffs and their risk for ASD:

So what's wrong here? Not much, except for the fact that the relative risk only sees a modest increase at the 24 month cutoff. The true increase is seen at 36 months. So why is this important? Because symptoms of autism are most noticeable starting at age 3. This isn't anything new Hooker. That's why DeStefano et al. controlled for age in their original study. Because they're not stupid.

But why was there an increase in exclusively African American male children? The answer is simple again. Table 4 from the study shows us this:

Hooker reveals that he had to use a 31 month cutoff because he was limited in terms of sample size. This, also, isn't anything new in the realm of statistics, Hooker. Smaller sample sizes are going to potentially yield misleading results because the smaller the sample, the greater its susceptibility to statistical noise. Funny enough, Hooker didn't even provide his sample size. The very lack of transparency in Hooker's paper, after being prompted by accusations of a lack of transparency in the CDC, is absolutely egregious.

This didn't take very long to research and debunk; in fact, I was surprised at how little exposure this study got. Perhaps we're all learning something from these types of studies: they provide nothing informative, and are only reflections of someone's ideologically grinding teeth and hand waving. In doing so, Hooker hooked a hoax: his own.

Thank you all very much for reading.

UPDATE: Translational Neurodegeneration has taken Hooker's article off public domain for concerns about the validity of its findings. You can find it in full here.

(8/28/2014) Yesterday, Dr. Thompson released a statement via his lawyers clearing the air of any doubts: Wakefield is just as disingenuous and manipulative as he's always been.

(10/3/2014) Brian Hooker's paper was retracted from the journal of Translational Neurodegeneration after concerns were expressed of its validity. The PubMed link still works.

*I would also highly recommend looking at this infographic from Healthcare Management Degree.
Sources are at the bottom of the page.*



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References:

DeStefano, F., Bhasin, T., Thompson, W., Yeargin-Allsopp, M., & Boyle, C. (2004). Age at First Measles-Mumps-Rubella Vaccination in Children With Autism and School-Matched Control Subjects: A Population-Based Study in Metropolitan Atlanta. PEDIATRICS, 113 (2), 259-266 DOI: 10.1542/peds.113.2.259

Hooker, B. (2014). Measles-mumps-rubella vaccination timing and autism among young african american boys: a reanalysis of CDC data. Translational Neurodegeneration, 3 (1) DOI: 10.1186/2047-9158-3-16

Pseudoscience And Ad Hominems: Is Religion a Mental Illness?

Could something so normative be a mental disorder?

I had a polite exchange on Google+ for once, but it quickly turned into something appalling for me, personally. The person who made the comment I was disgusted by has not replied to my rebuttal yet, thus I won't directly link to the thread; however, I can copy/paste their comment here for context:

"Religion is a mental illness (only differences between believers, are the stage on which this mental illness manifests).+(Anon) you should seek professional help, for believing in a non-existent zombie that there is absolutely no proof of it's existence, ever."

I've heard people claim that religion is a mental illness before. I still hate hearing it each time, because it's just ridiculous and unproductive. At the same time, I've never heard any rationale for this belief either, and thus I was just led to believe that it's nothing more than an insult. Apparently though, there are some people who truly believe they have evidence for religion being a mental disorder. Specifically, it seems that the link is between religion and schizophrenia, or is simply consisting of attributing several different symptoms to religious belief and claiming that that qualifies it as a mental disorder. The latter is a grotesque simplification of what diagnosing a mental disorder actually involves, but we'll get to that later. For now, let's address the link between religion and schizophrenia. Just to quantify some claims, let's refer to the Wikipedia page on religion and schizophrenia:

"The relationship between religion and schizophrenia is of particular interest to psychologists because of the similarities between religious experiences and psychotic episodes; religious experiences often involve auditory and/or visual hallucinations, and those with schizophrenia commonly report similar hallucinations, along with a variety of delusions and faulty beliefs. A common report from those with schizophrenia is some type of a religious delusion - that is, they believe they are divine beings, God is talking to them, they are possessed by demons, etc. In a study of patients with schizophrenia that had been previously admitted to a hospital, 24% had religious delusions. This has led some researchers to question whether schizophrenia leads an individual to become more religious, or if intense religiosity leads to schizophrenia."

The prevalence of religious delusions and hallucinations among patients diagnosed with schizophrenia is unequivocal, clearly, but why does this necessitate that religion may be linked causally to schizophrenia, or vice versa? One should expect that in a society where religion has a heavy influence, that hallucinations should involve religion at least some of the time. This doesn't mean that religion is a mental illness; instead, it just means that religion is a common outlet for delusional thoughts and behaviours. The source cited for the 24% figure, Religious delusions in patients admitted to hospital with schizophrenia by Siddle et al. (2002) also states this to be the case, emphasis my own:

"Having a religious belief or having religious delusional belief provides a framework by which people can make sense of negative life experiences. This is said to be helpful to people as it allows them something of a buffer against the depressing effects of uncontrollable life stresses (Park et al. 1990). To summarise, religious beliefs are fairly common and are not pathological. Religious people demonstrate an external attributional bias. A proportion of people will experience psychotic experiences, some of which will involve auditory hallucinations. [...] These religious experiences and delusions may help the person to deal with the negative life events they are faced with."

While Siddle et al. maintains that religious beliefs are not pathological (i.e. not being a result of mental illness or disorder), it's hard to interpret the results of studies suggesting the link between schizophrenia and religious belief because it begs the question: what exactly is a religious delusion? This is a problem because, even as the authors point out, in most studies, the definition of a "religious delusion" is not actually outlined or defined. They do offer an outline of their own, as produced by Sims (1995), which identifies a religious delusion as meeting the following characteristics:

1: Both the observed behaviour and the subjective experience conformed with psychiatric symptoms in that the patient's self-description of the experience was recognisable as having the form of a delusion;

2: There were other recognisable symptoms of mental illness in other areas of the individual's life; other delusions, hallucinations, mood or thought disorder and so on;

3: The lifestyle, behaviour and direction of the personal goals of the individual after the event or after the religious experience were consistent with the natural history of mental disorder rather than with a personally enriching life experience.

Charitably, a religious experience, don't you agree?

This seems to make sense, and I'll refer to it later, but again it begs the question: what is a religious
experience? We could charitably assume that a religious experience is defined as having any reference to God or religious symbolism, but it would only help to suppose what was suggested earlier -- that religious experiences can be said to be a product of one's culture or society, where religion is prevalent. To avoid such a dead end and unconvincing argument, we'll approach the arguments made by the third link I provided at the beginning of this post.

Before we even examine such claims, we have to ask ourselves "what is a mental illness?" Generally, the clinically appropriate term is a "disorder," but illness is still sometimes used. In a broad sense, a mental disorder can be defined as "a mental or behavioral pattern or anomaly that causes either suffering or an impaired ability to function in ordinary life (disability), and which is not developmentally or socially normative." This is according to Wikipedia; however, the DSM-V gives us a different definition of a mental disorder:

"A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant disturbance in an individual's cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying mental functioning. Mental disorders are usually associated with significant distress in social, occupational, or other important activities. An expectable or culturally approved response to a common stressor or loss, such as the death of a loved one, is not a mental disorder. Socially deviant behavior (e.g., political, religious, or sexual) and conflicts that are primarily between the individual and society are not mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict results from a dysfunction in the individual, as described above."

It's very clear that by the first definition, religion does not qualify as a mental disorder, as it is a subscription of social norms; however, does religion fit under the DSM-V definition? Let's examine the seven reasons given for why religion is a mental disorder by that group linked to earlier:

1: Hallucinations - the person has invisible friends who (s)he insists are real, and to whom (s)he speaks daily, even though nobody can actually see or hear these friends.

2: Delusions - the patient believes that the invisible friends have magical powers to make them rich, cure cancer, bring about world peace, and will do so eventually if asked.

3: Denial/Inability to learn - though the requests for world peace remain unanswered, even after hundreds of years, the patients persist with the praying behaviour, each time expecting different results.

4: Inability to distinguish fantasy from reality - the beliefs are contingent upon ancient mythology being accepted as historical fact.

5: Paranoia - the belief that anyone who does not share their supernatural concept of reality is "evil," "the devil," "an agent of Satan".

6: Emotional abuse - ­ religious concepts such as sin, hell, cause feelings of guilt, shame, fear, and other types of emotional "baggage" which can scar the psyche for life.

7: Violence - many patients insist that others should share in their delusions, even to the extent of using violence.

As much as I hate him, he's not (very) dysfunctional

It cannot be argued that some, if not all of these symptoms (although crudely characterized) cannot be applied to certain people, both religious and nonreligious; however, the diagnosis of a mental disorder is often reliant on symptomatic clusters. That is, symptoms are grouped together, and the mental disorder is diagnosed if the patient exhibits several or all of the symptoms in the cluster. That being said, it can hardly be suggested that all, or even most religious people experience all or most of the above symptoms. What of the ones that do, however? If someone were just devoutly religious and experienced all or most of the above symptoms, could we classify them as having a mental disorder? Well, it depends on what we're looking at. Let's take the example of "delusions" -- could we take a person's religious delusions and use them as evidence that they show symptoms of a mental disorder? It's informative, now, to look at the previous characteristics of a religious delusion, specifically the last one:

3: The lifestyle, behaviour and direction of the personal goals of the individual after the event or after the religious experience were consistent with the natural history of mental disorder rather than with a personally enriching life experience.

This is consistent with the segment of the DSM-V definition of a mental disorder:

"A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant disturbance in an individual's cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying mental functioning."

Just because someone exhibits certain symptoms does not warrant their condition being labelled as a mental disorder; it is only warranted if their symptoms cause disturbance in their lives and prevents them from being autonomously functioning members of society. It cannot be said that the majority, or even a substantial portion of religious people are incapable of functioning in society. If this were the case, we would not have a society to live in; because it is reasonable that if one cannot function in society, they cannot also create a functioning society. Whether we admit to it or not, many cultures and civilizations around the world were created by people who had strong religious convictions. The vast majority of the world is made up of people with religious beliefs. If they were all suffering from a mental disorder, what functionality would the world hold? The answer would be virtually none.

A mental disorder is defined and classified based on whether or not it prevents a person from functioning properly in society, and their behaviour does not exhibit something typical of the society's norms. We cannot work backwards and say that religion is a mental disorder simply for the symptoms that some of its members hold. First, there has to be an overwhelming majority of them that exhibit these symptoms. Then, we have to show that these people cannot function properly in society, or are damaging to themselves and others. Then, we have to show that this lack of functionality is a result of psychological, biological, or developmental dysfunction.

None of the above has been shown for people of religious conviction; therefore, it is simply unfounded to assert that religious people have a mental disorder.

It's important to keep this in mind as we progress towards the future. Surely, some people don't honestly believe that religion can be clinically diagnosable as a mental disorder; some people just use it as an insult. That being said, having a mental disorder is not grounds as an insult. That's just not how it works. At the same time, skeptics, rationalists and atheists need to understand that ad hominem attacks like this are absolutely toxic and detrimental to legitimate discussion over theology and philosophy -- they only obfuscate the issue, and have no productive value. What reason do we have to be so hostile or adamant about something like this? Not only is the claim insulting to people who have mental disorders, but also to professionals who are familiar with how to diagnose such disorders, and last but not least, insulting to the people you're blatantly insulting (obviously).

To people who use this argument from a "clinical" perspective: you're subscribing to pseudoscience, which is much, much worse than simply having religious views, because your views are actually detrimental to honest discourse, and to knowledge.

To people who use this argument from a casual perspective: it's a baseless ad hominem attack and does nothing for anybody.

To both, just stop. It's disgusting.

And to everyone else, thank you very much for reading.



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References:

Siddle, R., Haddock, G., Tarrier, N., & Faragher, E. (2014). Religious delusions in patients admitted to hospital with schizophrenia. Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 37 (3), 130-138 DOI: 10.1007/s001270200005

Sims ACP (1995). Symptoms in the mind: an introduction to descriptive psychopathology (3rd ed.). W.B. Saunders, London

American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (5th ed.). Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing.